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Article
We predominantly stand in the present facing the future 
rather than looking back to the past
—Suddendorf and Corballis (2007)
Although not immediately intuitive, the idea that memory, 
imagination, and predicting what might happen in the 
future are intimately linked is not new. Throughout the 
centuries this notion has consistently reemerged within 
philosophical, psychological, and contemporary work, 
along with the belief that the role of recollection is to serve 
imagination and prediction of the future. For instance, in 
1798, Immanuel Kant noted that “Recalling the past 
(remembering) occurs only with the intention of making it 
possible to foresee the future” (p. 77); in 1871 the White 
Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass 
astutely observed, “It’s a poor sort of memory that only 
works backwards” (Carroll 1871, chap. 5); whereas in 
2006, Suddendorf argued, “It is accurate prediction of the 
future, more so than accurate memory of the past per se, 
that conveys adaptive advantage” (p. 1007).
There is behavioral evidence supporting the connec-
tion between memory and imagination of the future. For 
instance, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004) asked 
participants to mentally “re-experience” personal past 
events (episodic memory) or to “pre-experience” (epi-
sodic future thinking; Atance and O’Neill 2001) possible 
future events that had/would occur in the close or distant 
past/future. For the past and future, temporally close 
events were associated with more sensorial and contex-
tual details and evoked stronger feelings of re-experienc-
ing (or pre-experiencing) than the temporally distant 
equivalents. Similarly, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 
(2006) showed that individual differences, such as capac-
ity for visual imagery, affect the phenomenological expe-
rience of episodic memory and episodic future thinking. 
Notably, specific errors made when recollecting the past 
are also evident when people engage in predicting the 
future (for a review, see Gilbert and Wilson 2007).
If memory and imagination are intimately linked, it is 
natural to ask whether they are supported by the same 
neural structures. This has been examined in two ways, 
one with a focus on the hippocampus (Fig. 1) and the 
other with an eye to an extended set of brain areas—
including medial and lateral prefrontal, posterior cingu-
late and retrosplenial cortices, lateral temporal cortex, 
and the medial temporal lobes (MTL)—often called the 
“core network” for episodic memory and imagination 
(Fig. 2; Buckner and Carroll 2007; Spreng and others 
2009). Considering first the hippocampus, since the semi-
nal work of Scoville and Milner (1957), the MTL and in 
particular the hippocampus have been recognized as 
playing a pivotal role in our ability to recollect past expe-
riences. Their article described the case of HM who 
underwent bilateral temporal lobectomy for the relief of 
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On the face of it, memory, imagination, and prediction seem to be distinct cognitive functions. However, metacognitive, 
cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence is emerging that they are not, suggesting intimate links in 
their underlying processes. Here, we explore these empirical findings and the evolving theoretical frameworks that 
seek to explain how a common neural system supports our recollection of times past, imagination, and our attempts 
to predict the future.
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intractable epilepsy, rendering him amnesic, unable to 
acquire new episodic memories. They noted “after the 
operation this young man could no longer recognize the 
hospital staff nor find his way to the bathroom, and he 
seemed to recall nothing of the day-to-day events of his 
hospital life” (Scoville and Milner 1957, p. 14). The case 
of HM precipitated 50 years of subsequent work examin-
ing the role of the hippocampus in memory (for reviews, 
see Corkin 2002; Squire 2004).
Memory, however, is not the only function that has 
been ascribed to the hippocampus. In the 1970s, O’Keefe 
and Dostrovsky (1971) discovered cells in the rat hippo-
campus that displayed location-specific firing (so-called 
“place cells”; Fig. 3A), and damage to the hippocampus 
was found to severely disrupt spatial navigation ability 
(Morris and others 1982). This evidence prompted 
O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) to suggest the hippocampus 
plays a key role in both memory and spatial navigation. 
Although this idea has been debated (Cohen and 
Eichenbaum 1991), the onus remains on theoretical 
accounts of hippocampal function to explain the mne-
monic (Spiers and others 2001) and navigation (Fig. 3B; 
Maguire and others 2006) deficits observed in patients 
following bilateral hippocampal damage (Burgess and 
others 2002). But it seems that even explaining memory 
and navigation is not sufficient; as the links between 
memory, imagination, and thinking about the future have 
crystallized, evidence has started to accrue implicating 
the hippocampus and the core network in these latter 
functions also. In fact, there has been an explosion of 
interest in this domain, with Klein (2013) noting a 10-fold 
increase in investigative activity in the last five years. So 
what is the evidence that a common neural system, which 
includes the hippocampus, underpins memory, imagina-
tion, and prediction of the future?
Neuropsychological Evidence
Patients with Bilateral Hippocampal Damage 
and Amnesia
Initial interest in the neural substrates of the imagination 
of future scenarios can be traced to early neuropsycho-
logical observations which tentatively suggested that 
patients with severe amnesia also had difficulties imagin-
ing and planning their personal future (e.g., Korsakoff 
and others 1996; Talland 1965). This paved the way for 
more detailed investigations. For instance, patient KC 
who became profoundly amnesic after suffering wide-
spread brain damage (including to the MTL) appeared 
unable to imagine his personal future (Tulving 1985; see 
also Rosenbaum and others 2005). Similarly, patient DB 
displayed episodic memory impairments equal in sever-
ity to patient KC’s and was also unable to project himself 
into the future (Klein and others 2002). As these patients 
had suffered widespread neurological damage it was not 
possible to localize the ability to think about the future to 
specific brain regions.
No formal study was published investigating HM’s 
ability to imagine fictitious events, but anecdotal evi-
dence suggests his ability to predict his personal future 
was impaired. When, in 1992, HM was asked what he 
believed he would do tomorrow he replied “whatever is 
beneficial” and appeared to have “no database to consult 
when asked what he would do the next day, week, or in 
years to come” (S. Corkin, personal communication; 
cited in de Vito and Della Sala 2011). Similarly, when 
HM was asked to make a prediction about his personal 
future, he would respond with a happening from the dis-
tant past or he did not respond at all (S. Steinvorth and S. 
Corkin, personal communication; cited in Buckner 2010). 
This suggests that the MTL, including the hippocampus, 
Figure 1. The human hippocampus. The top panel shows the 
hippocampi circled in red on sagittal (left), coronal (middle) 
and axial (right) views from a structural MRI brain scan. The 
hippocampus is composed of a number of subfields, CA1, 
CA2, CA3, which are adjoined by neighboring areas—the 
dentate gyrus (DG), the subiculum (SUB), presubiculum, 
parasubiculum, and entorhinal cortex—to form the extended 
hippocampal formation. Three-dimensional images of two 
example hippocampi are shown with some of the subregions 
indicated (from Bonnici and others 2012).
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supports the recollection of the past and the imagination 
of the future.
It was not until 2007, however, that the first systematic 
study of imagination ability in patients with selective 
bilateral hippocampal damage was published (Hassabis 
and others 2007b). These profoundly amnesic patients 
were unable to construct atemporal fictitious scenes (i.e., 
scenes with no past or future temporal connotations) in the 
mind’s eye or to imagine future events involving them-
selves. For example, when asked to imagine simple fic-
tional scenes such as “imagine lying on a white sandy 
beach in a beautiful tropical bay” they, unlike controls, 
struggled to construct a coherent response (Fig. 4). When 
formally measured, the patients’ scenes were significantly 
less vivid and more spatially fragmented than those of 
controls, effects that have since been replicated in a new 
cohort of seven amnesic patients with focal hippocampal 
damage (Mullally and others 2012b). Interestingly, this 
deficit did not appear to be a generalized imagination 
deficit as the patients were able to vividly imagine single 
acontextual objects. Nor did it appear to be solely attribut-
able to their memory deficits, because when they were 
presented with all of the individual scene components 
required to construct scenes, the patients remained unable 
to use these elements to form cohesive scene representa-
tions (Hassabis and others 2007b). Hassabis and others 
(2007b) proposed that there was something specific about 
the imagination of spatially coherent fictitious or future 
scenes that requires the hippocampus.
Other groups have since reported scene imagination 
deficits in patients with bilateral hippocampal damage 
(Andelman and others 2010; Race and others 2011). For 
example, Race and others (2011) found that amnesic 
patients with MTL damage were impaired at recollecting 
their remote and recent past and at imagining their near 
and distant futures. Critically, these patients were able to 
generate appropriate and detailed story-based narratives 
when presented with drawings of scenes, indicating that a 
Figure 2. The “core network” for memory and imagination. These are the activations in common for recalling personal past 
events, recalling previously imagined scenes, and constructing novel scenes (from Hassabis and others 2007a). They are depicted 
on the averaged structural MRI brain scan of the study’s participants. Areas engaged, relative to baseline control tasks, included 
lateral and medial prefrontal cortices, precuneus, posterior cingulate, and retrosplenial cortices, lateral and medial temporal 
areas, including parahippocampal cortex and the hippocampus.
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generalized narrative problem is unlikely to account for 
the deficits observed.
Of note, several studies have observed apparently pre-
served ability to construct scenes in hippocampal-dam-
aged amnesic patients. Mullally and others (2012a) 
reported the case of P01, who had 50% volume loss along 
the length of both hippocampi and was densely amnesic, 
but who was nevertheless able to construct scenes in his 
imagination. Using fMRI they found that P01’s ability to 
construct scenes was associated with increased activity in 
the remnant tissue of his right hippocampus. This sug-
gests that residual function in his lesioned hippocampus 
was sufficient to support basic scene construction, but 
this was not enough to rescue his impaired episodic mem-
ory which likely requires intact connectivity between the 
hippocampus and the wider core network. In another 
study that failed to observe imagination-based deficits in 
patients with hippocampal damage (Squire and others 
2010), the patients were in fact not amnesic, showing 
instead only mild and non-significant memory deficits 
when compared with a control group (see more on this in 
Maguire and Hassabis 2011).
In the preceding patients, hippocampal damage 
occurred in adulthood. There is another group of patients 
whose damage is sustained much earlier in life resulting 
in developmental amnesia. Interestingly, such patients 
have been found to have a preserved ability to construct 
scenes (Cooper and others 2011; Hurley and others 
2011; Maguire and others 2010). However, it appears 
that their scene construction is effortful, and may be 
based on their intact semantic memory and world 
knowledge (Klein 2013). As such, it does not involve 
true visualization of an imagined scene, is limited and 
hippocampal independent.
Figure 3. Spatial navigation. (A) Recordings from the hippocampi of freely-moving rats show the presence of place cells that 
exhibit location-specific firing (Amaral and Witter, 1989, and Burgess and others 1999; reprinted with permission from Elsevier 
and Oxford University Press). The cell depicted here had its place field in the upper right corner of the arena. (B) When humans 
navigated routes around a virtual reality version of central London, UK, during fMRI scanning, their hippocampus was engaged 
(from Spiers and Maguire, 2006). Map reproduced by permission of Geographers’ A-Z Map Co. Ltd. © Crown Copyright 2005. 
All rights reserved. Licence number 100017302.
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Figure 4. Scene construction in patients with hippocampal damage and amnesia. The top panel shows an example of an imagined 
scenario from Hassabis and others (2007b). The cue is shown at the top, below which is an excerpt from P03, a patient with 
bilateral hippocampal damage, followed by that of a control participant who was age-, education-, and IQ-matched to P03. 
Interviewer’s probing comments are in italics. Relevant background information is noted in square brackets. Underneath are 
shown coronal sections from the MRI brain scans of four patients, including P03, who were impaired at constructing scenes. The 
bilateral hippocampal atrophy is notable on each scan. In the lower panel (left) scores on the Experiential Index are provided—
this was a measure of the overall richness of the imagined scenes. On the right, scores from the Spatial Coherence Index are 
given—this was a measure of the spatial contiguity and coherence of the scenes. Data for each of the four patients and every 
control participant are represented by black dots; horizontal bars indicate the group means.
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Imagination Deficits in Other Populations
Imagination deficits have also been observed in older 
adults and in other patient groups; populations in which 
hippocampal and other neural components of the “core 
network” are known to be compromised (for review, see 
Schacter and others 2008). In one study, Addis and others 
(2008) noted deficits in future simulations in older adults. 
In a subsequent study, Addis and others (2010) sought to 
investigate whether impairment could simply be an 
expression of episodic memory deficits whereby elderly 
adults simply “recast” entire remembered events into the 
future. Using a recombination paradigm (see also Addis 
and others 2009) participants first provided a set of auto-
biographical memories and were later asked to imagine 
novel events containing a combination of specific details 
taken from these episodic memories. The older adults 
continued to generate fewer episodic details for imagined 
events suggesting that recollection difficulties alone can-
not explain their impaired imagination (see also Addis 
and others 2011; Gaesser and others 2011; Romero and 
Moscovitch 2012).
Coexisting memory and imagination impairments 
have also been noted in a number of other populations. 
Williams and others (1996) reported that suicidal, 
depressed patients’ recollection of the past and simula-
tion of the future lacked specific details and appeared 
“over-general” relative to controls. D’Argembeau and 
others (2008) found that patients with schizophrenia 
generated significantly fewer episodic details for both 
past and future events. Interestingly, hippocampal atro-
phy has been documented in depression (Bremner and 
others 2000), schizophrenia (Herold and others 2013), 
and in the aging brain (Driscoll and Sutherland 2005), 
suggesting that damage to this brain region may be a 
critical factor underlying these disparate cognitive 
impairments.
Looking beyond the hippocampus, there have been 
few neuropsychological studies focused on the role of 
brain areas outside the MTL in imagination of fictitious/
future scenes/events. In one such study, Berryhill and 
others (2010) tested patients with parietal and prefrontal 
cortex lesions. Both patient types were impaired, although 
the precise reasons for this were unclear. The authors sug-
gest, for example, that the frontal patients may have had 
difficulty with accessing and/or selecting elements for 
inclusion in the imagined scenes. Nevertheless, this study 
illustrates that the hippocampus does not act alone in 
imagination and predicting the future.
Neuroimaging Evidence
A wider network beyond the hippocampus has been high-
lighted in particular by neuroimaging studies. Episodic 
memory has been consistently linked with activation of 
the core network (Fig. 5; reviewed in Maguire 2001; 
Svoboda and others 2006). Attention then turned to prob-
ing whether imagination of fictitious and future events 
are also supported by a wider set of brain areas beyond 
the hippocampus, as suggested by the neuropsychologi-
cal findings, and if these are the same regions that support 
episodic memory (Okuda and others 2003). Addis and 
others (2007) showed extensive overlap in activity of this 
network (the medial and lateral prefrontal, posterior cin-
gulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and lateral temporal 
cortices, and the MTL) when participants recollected or 
imagined detailed events. This suggests that the episodic 
system is not solely involved in memory but may also 
support imagination-based processes. This was later 
extended to include scene construction processes when 
Hassabis and others (2007a) reported activation of the 
core network when participants recollected episodic 
memories, recollected previously imagined fictitious 
scenes, or constructed entirely novel fictitious scenes 
(Fig. 2; see also Addis and others 2009; Botzung and oth-
ers 2008; Spreng and others; Szpunar and others 2007). 
In summary, these data, coupled with the neuropsycho-
logical evidence, strongly indicate that the core network 
of brain regions that includes the hippocampus supports 
both mnemonic and imagination/simulation based 
processes.
Theoretical Accounts
Mental Time Travel into the Future
A number of theories have been proposed which attempt 
to explain the overlap between memory and imagination. 
One such account is based on Tulving’s (2002) proposal 
that recollection of episodic memories involves a mental 
journey into the past (i.e., mental time travel) in which 
one has a subjective sense of self over time (“autonoe-
sis”). This concept of mental time travel or self-projec-
tion, believed to depend on the integrity of the 
hippocampus, can also be applied to imagining the future 
and possibly spatial navigation (Buckner and Carroll 
2007; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; Szpunar and oth-
ers 2007). This account, however, struggles to explain 
why hippocampal-damaged patients are unable to imag-
ine atemporal fictitious scenes (Hassabis and others 
2007b; Mullally and others 2012b). Indeed, a recent 
fMRI study found that frontal and parietal cortices, but 
not the hippocampus, supported mental time travel 
(Nyberg and others 2010), and Andrews-Hanna and oth-
ers (2010) showed that imagining scenes best accounted 
for activity in the hippocampus and MTL, whereas other 
regions were concerned with the self and with time. Thus, 
the idea of mental time travel has undoubted heuristic 
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Figure 5. The episodic memory network. Significant peaks of activity from a meta-analysis of 24 neuroimaging studies of 
autobiographical memory (from Svoboda and others 2006). The classic “core” episodic memory network can be seen in red and 
includes the hippocampus bilaterally, parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial, posterior cingulate and posterior parietal cortices, 
and medial prefrontal cortex. Activations in core, secondary and infrequently reported regions are depicted across right and left, 
lateral, medial, and subcortical planes. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier.
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value and may account for the contributions of some 
areas in the core network to imagining the future, but not 
the hippocampus.
Constructive Episodic Simulation Hypothesis
The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis 
(reviewed in Schacter and others 2012) proposes that epi-
sodic memory and thinking about the future are supported 
by a similar neural network because they are both con-
structive in nature. In this way, episodic memory is con-
ceptualized as a constructive process (Bartlett 1932), 
whose critical function is to make available the informa-
tion required for the simulation/construction of future 
events. Thus, information is processed in a manner that 
enables the relevant details to be flexibly recombined to 
form a novel event. This hypothesized recombination 
process dovetails with existing theoretical accounts of 
hippocampal function that emphasize the role of the hip-
pocampus in binding arbitrary or accidentally occurring 
relations among individual elements within an experi-
ence (the relational theory; Cohen and Eichenbaum 1993; 
Konkel and Cohen 2009) and/or to the specific scene con-
text (the binding of items and contexts model, Ranganath 
2010). In this way the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis elegantly explains the co-activation of the 
core network during self-relevant mnemonic and future 
simulation processes. However, this account does not 
explain why patients with hippocampal damage and 
amnesia have such striking spatial navigation impair-
ments (Burgess and others 2002).
Scene Construction Theory
A third account is the scene construction theory (SCT; 
Hassabis and Maguire 2007, 2009; Maguire and Mullally 
2013), which was originally proposed following the obser-
vation that patients with hippocampal damage and amnesia 
are unable to imagine scenes. In contrast to the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis, which had a broader focus 
on the core network, SCT attempts to account specifically 
for the role of the hippocampus in imagination, memory, 
and spatial navigation. In essence, SCT proposes that the 
hippocampus primarily acts to facilitate the construction of 
atemporal scenes and in doing so allows the event details of 
episodic memories and imagined future experiences a foun-
dation on which to reside. In this way, hippocampal-depen-
dent scene construction processes are held to underpin and 
support episodic memory, predicting the future, spatial 
navigation, and perhaps even dreaming and mind-wander-
ing (Fig. 6), with the addition of self-related and temporal 
processing implemented via the recruitment of other regions 
within the core network.
Scene construction theory thus places scenes at the 
center of hippocampal information processing. It does 
not suggest that the hippocampus is solely responsible for 
episodic memory, future thinking, and spatial navigation, 
but rather that the hippocampus supplies a crucial ingre-
dient—scene construction—that they each require (see 
more on this in Maguire and Mullally 2013). This has 
intuitive appeal—for most people, recalling the past, 
thinking about the future, and planning how to get some-
where typically involves imagining scenes. Scenes are 
also a highly efficient means of packaging information. 
The SCT also resonates with the patients’ experiences of 
trying to imagine scenes:
There is no scene in front of me here. It’s frustrating because 
I feel like there should be. I feel like I’m listening to the 
radio instead of watching it on the TV. I’m trying to imagine 
different things happening but there’s no visual scene 
opening out in front of me.
It’s hard trying to get the space, it keeps getting squashed. 
(Mullally and others 2012b).
The appeal of the SCT is that it offers a unified account of 
why such a wide range of seemingly disparate functions 
are impaired following hippocampal damage.
Figure 6. The scene construction theory (Hassabis and Maguire 2007, 2009; Maguire and Mullally 2013) contends that episodic 
memory, navigation, imagining fictitious scenes and imagining the future (and perhaps even dreaming and mind-wandering) 
encompass many processes that are not the primary concern of the hippocampus. Nevertheless, it proposes that they each rely 
on the hippocampus for a critical component which is the construction of spatially coherent scenes.
 at University College London on September 6, 2013nro.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Mullally and Maguire 9
Further recent evidence appears to place scene con-
struction at the heart of hippocampal processing. 
Boundary extension (BE; Intraub and Richardson 1989; 
Fig. 7A) is a ubiquitous cognitive phenomenon where we 
erroneously remember seeing more of a scene than was 
present in the sensory input, and occurs because when we 
view a scene, we implicitly extrapolate beyond the bor-
ders to form an extended representation of that scene. In 
the absence of the original visual input, this extended 
scene is misremembered instead of the original input, 
causing a memory error. BE is a robust and consistent 
effect found in adults (Intraub and Richardson 1989; 
Seamon and others 2002), children (Seamon and others 
2002) and even babies (Quinn and Intraub 2007). Of note, 
BE only occurs in relation to scenes and not single iso-
lated objects (Gottesman and Intraub 2002), a dissocia-
tion that mirrors the imagination dichotomy observed in 
amnesic patients (Hassabis and others 2007b).
Boundary extension is composed of two stages 
(Fig. 7B). The first (the BE effect) requires intact scene 
construction because it involves the active extrapolation 
of the scene beyond its physical boundaries resulting in 
an internally generated “extended scene” representation 
that persists when the scene is no longer visible. The sec-
ond phase (the BE error) occurs at retrieval when this 
internally generated extended scene is conflated with the 
previously viewed scene from phase 1 producing a mem-
ory error. Thus, when people are presented consecutively 
with exactly the same scene, they consistently judge the 
scene that is viewed second as being closer-up than the 
first scene, even though the two scenes are identical. The 
original scene need only be absent for as little as 42 ms 
for BE to be apparent, underscoring the online and spon-
taneous nature of the BE effect (Intraub and Dickinson 
2008). Critically, BE depends on an intact ability to con-
struct scenes. Thus, patients with bilateral hippocampal 
damage and severe amnesia, who are unable to construct 
scenes should be unable to form this extended represen-
tation and therefore fail to commit the BE memory error. 
This would result in a situation where amnesic patients 
display superior memory performance relative to healthy 
controls.
This is exactly what Mullally and others (2012b) 
recently demonstrated on a variety BE paradigms (Fig. 8). 
They investigated BE using a rapid serial visual presen-
tation task (Fig. 8A) whereby participants were consecu-
tively presented with two identical scenes and asked to 
rate the second scene relative to the first (note that on 
any one trial the two scenes were identical). Seven 
patients with selective bilateral hippocampal damage 
and amnesia correctly identified that the study and test 
pictures were identical with greater frequency than con-
trols, demonstrating more veridical memory (Fig. 8B). 
They also made significantly fewer BE-driven errors 
(“closer-up” responses), whereas the number of random 
errors (“further away” responses) did not differ between 
the groups.
Participants also performed other BE tasks where they 
drew simple scenes from memory, and explored and 
reconstructed scenes while blindfolded using touch alone 
(haptic task). In both instances the amnesic patients’ BE 
was greatly attenuated. Overall, therefore, these hippo-
campal-damaged patients had significantly reduced BE 
relative to matched controls across a number of indepen-
dent measures. However, being unencumbered by the BE 
effect meant that these amnesic patients displayed supe-
rior memory to that of non-amnesic controls. Consequently, 
these results enabled Mullally and others (2012b) to con-
clude that the patients’ attenuated BE could not be attrib-
uted to memory impairment. Therefore, in this context, 
impaired memory did not lead to impaired scene construc-
tion. Instead, impaired scene construction actually lead to 
better memory; thus successfully separating these two 
processes.
These data also suggest that a function of the hippo-
campus is the implicit and continuous prediction of the 
upcoming environment, that is, the hippocampus is con-
tinually constructing scenes, extrapolating beyond the 
boundaries of our current field of view. A recent neuroim-
aging study (Chadwick and others 2012) that investigated 
the role of the hippocampus in BE, supports this hypoth-
esis. Specifically, they found robust activity in the hip-
pocampus during the presentation of the original scene 
stimulus. Significantly, this activity was observed only on 
the trials where participants later committed the BE error. 
This suggests that the hippocampus is involved early at 
the initial stages of the BE effect where the predictive 
scene extension processes (attenuated in the hippocam-
pal-damaged patients) are hypothesized to occur. Thus, 
far from indexing mnemonic impairment, these data 
(Chadwick and others 2012; Mullally and others 2012b), 
in addition to the original scene construction findings 
(Hassabis and others 2007a; Hassabis and others 2007b; 
Mullally and others 2012b), support the idea that the pri-
mary function of the hippocampus may not be mnemonic 
(Maguire and Mullally 2013; see also Graham and others 
2010) but may instead be to predict the nature of the 
world beyond the immediate sensorium (Bar 2011).
Interestingly, electrophysiological studies in rodents 
documenting preplay are starting to add to this evolving 
picture by hinting at animal parallels in imagining and 
predicting what might occur in the future (e.g., Diba and 
Buzsaki 2007; Dragoi and Tonegawa 2011, 2013; Johnson 
and Redish 2007; Moser and Moser 2011; Fig. 9).
Conclusions and Future Directions
In conclusion, metacognitive, cognitive, neuropsycho-
logical, and neuroimaging evidence clearly illustrate the 
close ties between episodic memory, imagination and 
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Figure 7. The phenomenon of boundary extension. (A) Healthy participants viewed the picture on the left for 15 seconds. It was 
then removed and they were required to immediately draw the picture from memory. An example drawing is shown on the right. 
It is obvious that the participant included much more background than was presented in the picture seconds earlier, thus exhibiting 
boundary extension (BE; from Intraub and others 1996; reprinted with permission from Elsevier). (B) BE has two phases. When 
we see a picture of a scene (top panel), we automatically extrapolate beyond the physical edges of that scene (second panel). This 
active extension of the scene is the “BE effect.” When the scene is no longer present, the extended content and context beyond 
the boundaries become incorporated into our internal representation of the scene (third panel). Thus, in phase 2, when exactly the 
same picture is presented at test (fourth panel), we compare the now extended internal representation to the test picture, leading 
to a perception that the test picture is “closer” than the original study picture, even though they are identical. This memory error 
is the “BE error,” (from Chadwick and others 2012; reprinted with permission from Elsevier).
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predicting the future. In general, we believe that future 
studies in humans could greatly benefit from de-conflat-
ing two issues—how do we learn and remember our past 
experiences, and what does the hippocampus do. Despite 
the hippocampus being widely regarded as the quintes-
sential episodic memory device, as outlined in this arti-
cle, memory and the hippocampus are not simply 
interchangeable. By releasing the hippocampus from 
strictly mnemonic accounts of its function, we believe 
that a theoretically enriched understanding of its funda-
mental role and its breakdown in pathology can emerge. 
To truly ascertain, then, what it is the hippocampus does, 
a useful strategy going forward, as proposed in the SCT, 
may be to consider the range of disparate cognitive func-
tions that have been linked to the hippocampus, including 
memory, imagination, and predicting the future, and 
deduce from this what common underlying processes or 
mechanisms may be hippocampally mediated (Maguire 
and Mullally 2013).
In particular, we need to know more about precisely 
how the hippocampus supports the construction of 
scenes, and how this interacts with known computa-
tions, such as pattern separation and pattern comple-
tion, that occur in its subfields. Does BE occur in 
non-humans, and if so, what can we learn about 
the mechanisms involved from electrophysiological 
Figure 8. Boundary extension (BE) in patients with hippocampal damage and amnesia. (A) Timeline of an example trial from a 
rapid serial visual presentation BE task (from Mullally and others 2012b). The initial photograph of a simple scene was presented 
briefly followed by a dynamically changing mask. The second (test) picture (which unknown to the participants was always 
identical to the original picture) immediately followed the mask. The task was to rate the second picture relative to the first. 
There were five options ranging from “much closer-up” to “much farther away,” including the correct response “the same.” 
(B) BE is revealed by disproportionally larger number of “closer-up” responses. Overall, Mullally and others (2012b) found 
that control participants made significantly more of these erroneous responses, whereas patients with bilateral hippocampal 
damage and amnesia made significantly more accurate (i.e., “the same”) responses, and thus showed significantly reduced BE 
relative to controls. Means (±SEM); *P < 0.05. (C) In a drawing task (also from Mullally and others 2012b) scene photographs 
(examples shown in the left panel) were studied for 15 seconds and immediately drawn from memory. Drawings by an example 
hippocampal-damaged amnesic patient (middle left panel) and two matched healthy control participants (middle right and right 
panels) are displayed. As is evident, this patient more accurately depicted the proportional size of the object relative to the 
background whereas the control participants’ drawings expose how they extrapolated beyond the given view. Reprinted with 
permission from Elsevier.
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studies? Looking beyond the hippocampus, how does 
hippocampal-dependent scene construction relate to the 
operation of other cortical areas in the core network 
such as the parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices, 
that are often labeled as “scene-selective” (Auger and 
others 2012; Mullally and Maguire 2011). What are the 
precise functions of each area within the core network, 
and the connectivity between them? There is much yet 
to learn, and an understanding of the relationship 
between episodic memory, imagination and predicting 
the future is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, we are 
confident that the next five years will hasten important 
new insights into this question that has intrigued down 
the ages.
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Figure 9. Replay and preplay in the mouse hippocampus. This cartoon (from Moser and Moser 2011, reproduced from Nature 
with permission) shows that when an animal is resting, sequences of neural activity in its hippocampus resemble those that took 
place during a previous experience, suggesting that the experience is replayed. Dragoi and Tonegawa (2011) have shown that 
resting mice also preplay activity sequences that are predictive of subsequent activity in environments never visited before.
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